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Does Eco-Certification Have Environmental Benefits?  
Organic Coffee in Costa Rica  
Allen Blackman and Maria A. Naranjo 
Abstract 
Eco-certification of coffee, timber and other high-value agricultural commodities is increasingly 
widespread. In principle, it can improve commodity producers’ environmental performance, even in 
countries where state regulation is weak. However, evidence needed to evaluate this hypothesis is 
virtually nonexistent. To help fill this gap, we use detailed farm-level data to analyze the environmental 
impacts of organic coffee certification in central Costa Rica. We use propensity score matching to control 
for self-selection bias. We find that organic certification improves coffee growers’ environmental 
performance. It significantly reduces chemical input use and increases adoption of some environmentally 
friendly management practices.   
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Does Eco-Certification Have Environmental Benefits?  
Organic Coffee in Costa Rica  
Allen Blackman and Maria A.Naranjo∗ 
1. Introduction 
Initiatives certifying that agricultural commodities have been produced in an 
environmentally friendly manner are increasingly popular. For example, more than 120 million 
hectares of forest have been certified by the Pan European Forest Certification Agency, the 
Forest Stewardship Council, and other organizations (Rametsteiner and Simula 2003). And 
global production of organic, Rainforest Alliance, and other types of eco-certified coffees has 
recently grown by 10 to 20 percent per year, a rate far higher than that for other types of 
specialty coffee (Kilian et al. 2004).  
According to proponents, certification schemes like these have the potential to improve 
commodity producers’ environmental performance (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Rice and 
Ward 1996). In theory, they can do this by enabling the consumer to differentiate among 
commodities based on their environmental attributes. This improved information facilitates price 
premiums for certified commodities, and these premiums, in turn, create financial incentives for 
producers to meet certification standards. 
If that logic holds, certification may help address pressing environmental problems 
associated with agricultural commodities in developing countries. Growing and processing 
bananas, cocoa, coffee, timber, and other high-value agricultural products in poor countries often 
entails deforestation, soil erosion, and agrochemical pollution. These problems are difficult to 
tackle using conventional command-and-control regulation because producers are often small, 
numerous, and geographically dispersed while regulatory institutions are undermanned and 
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underfunded (Wehrmeyer and Mulugetta 1999). Certification schemes have the potential to 
sidestep these constraints by creating a private sector system of economic incentives, monitoring, 
and enforcement.   
Yet certification programs that aim to improve commodity producers’ environmental 
performance also faces important challenges. They must use standards stringent enough and 
monitoring and enforcement strict enough to ensure that poorly performing producers are 
excluded. In addition, they must offer price premiums high enough to offset the costs of 
certification. Even if these two challenges are met, certification schemes can still be undermined 
by selection effects. Commodity producers already meeting certification standards have strong 
incentives to select into certification programs: they need not make additional investments in 
environmental management to pass muster and can obtain price premiums and other benefits. 
But certification programs that mainly attract such producers will have limited effects on 
producer behavior and few environmental benefits.  
Although a growing academic literature examines commodity certification, we still know 
little about whether it actually affects producers’ environmental performance. As discussed 
below, few studies evaluate the environmental impacts of certification, and many of those that do 
rely on problematic methods that bias their results. To identify certification impacts, an 
evaluation must construct a reasonable counterfactual outcome, that is, an estimate of what 
environmental outcomes for certified entities would have been had they not been certified. 
However, most evaluations use problematic counterfactual outcomes: either certified producers’ 
precertification outcomes or uncertified producers’ outcomes. In the first case, results are biased 
whenever outcomes change during the study period because of factors unrelated to certification 
(including changes in commodity prices, input prices, weather conditions, and technology, all of 
which are common). In the second case, results are biased whenever commodity producers 
already meeting certification standards select into certification.  
A variety of ex post statistical methods are available to overcome these problems 
including propensity score matching and instrumental variables (Ferraro 2009; Frondel and 
Schmidt 2005). A recent comprehensive review of the empirical studies of certification of 
agricultural commodities and tourism operations found only three that use such methods to 
identify environmental impacts (Blackman and Rivera 2010). None of these studies examined 
certification for one of the most prominent high-value agricultural commodities: coffee.  
As a first step toward filling that gap, this paper presents an evaluation of the 
environmental impacts organic coffee certification in central Costa Rica. We use rich farm-level 
data from a recent census of coffee growers and a geographic information system (GIS) that 
comprises detailed geophysical data. We rely on propensity score matching to control for Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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selection bias. We find that certification does have an environmental benefit. It significantly 
reduces use of all three chemical inputs for which we have data (pesticides, chemical fertilizers, 
and herbicides) and spurs adoption of at least one of the four environmentally friendly 
management practices for which we have data (organic fertilizer). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews 
the literature evaluating the environmental effects of coffee certification. The third section 
presents background on coffee production, organic certification, and our study area. The fourth 
section discusses our empirical strategy and data. The fifth section presents our results, and the 
last section discusses their policy implications.   
2. Literature 
Rigorous evaluations of the environmental impacts of certification are rare, and those that 
have been conducted have failed to find significant effects. Blackman and Rivera (2010) 
reviewed 133 studies of commodity certification and identified only three that both constructed a 
reasonable counterfactual and focused on environmental (versus socioeconomic) impacts. These 
studies, which examine timber and tourism sectors, conclude that the environmental effects of 
certification are negligible. De Lima et al. (2008) analyze Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification in the Brazilian Amazon. They find few statistically significant differences in 
indicators of environmental performance for four FSC-certified forest associations and two 
matched uncertified associations. Rivera and de Leon (2004) and Rivera et al. (2006) analyze the 
Sustainable Slopes Program, a voluntary certification program established by the U.S. ski areas’ 
industry association. Using a Heckman procedure to control for self-selection bias, they compare 
third-party environmental performance ratings of certified and uncertified ski areas. They find 
that in the Sustainable Slopes Program’s early years, uncertified areas actually had better 
environmental performance than certified areas, and subsequently, they had equivalent but not 
superior levels.  
As for farm-level studies of coffee certification, to our knowledge, all existing studies 
that construct a reasonable counterfactual focus on socioeconomic impacts.1 Several less 
rigorous studies analyze environmental impacts by comparing environmental outcomes for 
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certified farms before and after certification or comparing outcomes for certified farms and 
unmatched uncertified farms. Most find few differences. Quispe Guanca (2007) uses survey data 
on changes in environmental management practices before and after certification (organic, FT, 
Rainforest Alliance, Utz Kapeh, and C.A.F.E. Practices) for a sample of 106 certified farms in 
Costa Rica. He finds that although all farms reduced herbicide use after certification, most did 
not reduce other agrochemicals. Philpott et al. (2007) compare ecological indicators for farms 
belonging to three certified organic, three certified organic and Fair Trade, and two uncertified 
cooperatives in Chiapas, Mexico. No effort is made to match the three types of cooperatives. 
They find no differences among the farms in ecological indicators. Finally, Martínez-Sánchez 
(2008) compares ecological indicators for 10 certified organic and 10 unmatched uncertified 
farms in northern Nicaragua. He finds that organic farms do not have significantly different 
shade levels, bird diversity, or bird abundance.  
3. Background 
3.1. Coffee in Costa Rica 
Although coffee is no longer the backbone of Costa Rica’s economy, it remains a leading 
agricultural commodity. Roughly 57,000 growers working on 100,000 hectares produce more 
than 2 million quintals (100-pound bags) of coffee beans annually, and coffee exports generate 
over US$200 million in export revenues annually. The coffee sector is dominated by thousands 
of small-scale growers: more than 90 percent produce less than 100 quintals of coffee per year 
(ICAFE 2007).  
Coffee growing in Costa Rica has serious environmental consequences that at least partly 
offset those economic benefits. Traditionally, Costa Rican coffee, like most coffee in Latin 
America, was grown alongside shade trees, an agroforestry system that predated the development 
of agrochemicals and therefore did not rely them. However, since the 1980s, 90 percent of the 
country’s coffee has been converted to a high-yielding “technified” monocrop in which coffee is 
grown with minimal shade cover and intensive application of agrochemicals, a system that was 
pioneered in Costa Rica (Adams and Ghaly 2007; Rice and Ward 1996). The switch to technified 
coffee has hastened soil erosion and contributed to such off-site negative externalities as the 
contamination and sedimentation of surface and groundwater (Adams and Ghaly 2006; Loria 
1992; Babbar and Zak 1995).  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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3.2. Organic Coffee Certification 
Organic agriculture certification requires producers to adhere to five broad production 
principles (Van der Vossen 2005; IFOAM 2010): 
•  use of composted organic matter instead of chemical fertilizers to maintain soil quality; 
•  use of natural methods for controlling disease, pests, and weeds instead of synthetic 
pesticides and herbicides; 
•  use of soil conservation practices, including contour planting, terracing, planting cover 
crops, mulching, and planting shade trees;  
•  minimum use of fossil fuels in the production process; and 
•  minimum pollution during postharvest handling.  
Several international organic certifying bodies, the largest of which is the International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), formulate basic organic standards for 
various commodities. These large organizations accredit smaller national ones, which in turn 
certify individual producers (not cooperatives) and conduct follow-up monitoring. Organic 
certifications require growers to complete a transition period of two to three years during which 
they must discontinue use of chemical inputs and adopt various conservation and pollution 
prevention practices. Certified producers are monitored at least once a year to ensure they 
continue to continue to meet organic standards.  
From coffee growers’ perspective, organic certification has both benefits and costs 
(Giovanuci and Ponte 2005; Van der Vossen 2005; Calo and Wise 2005). The main benefit is the 
price premium, which is set in international markets and averages 10 to 20 percent, depending on 
coffee quality. In addition, organic production reduces the costs of purchased inputs for growers 
who formerly depended on chemical inputs. It can also improve coffee quality. On the cost side, 
organic production typically increases labor costs and reduces yields for growers who formerly 
depended on chemical inputs. In addition, transaction costs—for initial certification, for 
subsequent annual monitoring and reporting—are significant. Annual costs can easily amount to 
5 percent of sales. All of these costs are generally borne by the grower. Note that the transition 
period implies that the grower must pay them for two to three years without the principal benefit 
of certification—a price premium.   
3.3. Study Area and Period 
We examine organic coffee certification in Turrialba, Costa Rica, an agricultural region 
(an administrative unit that would fall between a state and county in the United States) in the Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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country’s central valley, about 40 miles east of San José, Costa Rica’s capital city. The leading 
organic certifying organization in Turrialba is a Costa Rican organization called Eco-Logica, 
which is accredited by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, among other organizations. Certified 
farmers in this region belong to the Association of Organic Producers of Turrialba (Asociacion 
de Productores Organicos de Turrialba, APOT). For reasons discussed below, we analyze 
coffee certification in 2003, the year of our farm-level census data. In this year, Eco-Logica had 
certified 38 growers and was tracking 44 more in the transition phase. APOT’s organic 
production standards are included as Appendix A.    
4. Empirical Strategy and Data 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
Our analysis of organic certification’s impact on environmental performance confronts 
the usual program evaluation challenge (Rubin 1974; Holland 1986). Ideally, the impact of a 
program would be measured by comparing the outcome of interest for each agent both with and 
without program participation. However, we never actually observe both outcomes. In practice, 
therefore, a program’s impact is typically measured by comparing the average outcome for 
participants and for a control group of nonparticipants—with the latter average serving as the 
counterfactual. But as discussed in the introduction, this approach can be undermined if certain 
types of participants who tend to have certain outcomes select into the program. For example, in 
our case, small, undercapitalized farms that cannot afford to use chemical inputs may self-select 
into organic certification because the net benefits are high: they can meet organic standards and 
obtain price premiums without having to discontinue chemical input. Or farms on steeply sloped 
land that already use soil conservation measures may self-select into certification because they 
do not have to adopt them to meet organic standards. An evaluation that failed to control for such 
selection would conflate the effects of certification on outcomes with the effects of preexisting 
differences between certified and uncertified farms.  
To address this selection problem, we use a matching estimator. That is, following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and more recently Blackman et al. (2010), List et al. (2003), and 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we construct a matched control sample of uncertified farms that are 
very similar to the certified farms in terms of observable characteristics. We measure program 
impact as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)—the difference between the 
percentage of certified farms that use a management practice and the percentage of matched 
uncertified farms that use it.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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 This approach depends on two identifying assumptions. The first assumption, 
“ignorability” or “conditional independence,” is that conditional only on agents’ observed 
characteristics, the participation decision is ignorable for purposes of measuring outcomes. That 
is, we are able to observe and control for all variables that simultaneously affect the participation 
decision and the outcome variables. This first assumption is untestable. The second assumption, 
“common support” or “overlap,” is that the distribution of observed characteristics for 
nonparticipants is similar to that for participants, such that agents with similar characteristics 
have a positive probability of being participants and of being nonparticipants.  
    Creating a large set of matched pairs of farms with the exact same observed 
characteristics is challenging when, as in our case, these characteristics are numerous. However, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that we need to match farms only on the basis of their 
propensity score—that is, their likelihood of certification as predicted by a regression model—
which amounts to an index of farm and grower characteristics weighted by their importance in 
predicting certification. The propensity score method collapses the difficult problem of matching 
all observable characteristics to a much simpler one of matching a single summary variable. 
Various methods are available to match participants and nonparticipants based on 
propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008; Morgan and Harding 2006). To ensure 
robustness, we report results from five: (i) nearest neighbor 1-to-1 matching, wherein each 
certified farm is matched to the uncertified farm with the closest propensity score; (ii) nearest 
neighbor 1-to-4 matching, wherein each certified farm is matched to the four uncertified farms 
with the closest propensity scores and the counterfactual outcome is the average across these 
four; (iii) nearest neighbor 1-to-8 matching; (iv) nearest neighbor 1-to-16 matching; and (v) 
kernel matching, wherein a weighted average of all uncertified farms is used to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. For all five models we enforce a common support and allow matching 
with replacement.  
 Calculating standard errors for ATT estimated using propensity score matching is not 
straightforward because these errors should, in principle, account for the fact that propensity 
scores are estimated and for the imputation of the common support (Heckman et al. 1998). 
Therefore, following Dehijia and Whaba (2002) and others, we bootstrap standard errors (using 
1,000 replications).  
4.2. Data 
The data used for our analysis come from three sources. The first is a national census of 
Costa Rican coffee growers conducted by the National Statistics and Census Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INEC) in collaboration with the Costa Rican Coffee Institute Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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(Instituto del Café de Costa Rica, ICAFE). Data for Turrialba and Coto Brus (a neighboring 
region), with more than 6,000 farms, were collected in 2003. The INEC/ICAFE census includes 
dichotomous dummy variables that indicate whether farms use seven of the agriculture practices 
monitored by organic certifiers. We divide these into three “negative” practices that must be 
discontinued for APOT organic certification and four “positive” practices that must be adopted. 
The negative practices are use of: 
•  nematicides (pesticides); 
•  chemical fertilizers; and 
•  herbicides. 
The positive practices are use of: 
•  soil conservation measures such as deviation canals, water collection holes, water 
ladders, and vegetative barriers; 
•  shade trees; 
•  windbreaks; and 
•  organic fertilizer. 
In addition to information on these practices, the INEC/ICAFE data include information 
on grower characteristics (age and education), farm characteristics (e.g., geolocator information, 
size, and coffee variety), and geophysical characteristics (e.g., temperature and precipitation).  
Our second source of data is a GIS complied from a variety of sources. It comprises 
spatial data on geophysical characteristics of coffee farms, including elevation, aspect 
(directional orientation), slope, Holdridge life zone, and distances to coffee markets and 
population centers. 
Our final source of data is a list of 82 APOT farmers for 2003, the year of the 
INEC/ICAFE census, including 38 certified organic farms and 44 that were in transition. 
Because the APOT and INEC/ICAFE databases do not include a common identifying code, 
records were matched by owner name and farm size.  
Although the INEC/ICAFE census for Turrialba and Coto Brus covered more than 6,000 
farms, responses to certain questions are missing in some records. We drop all records for which 
responses needed to generate the variables used in our regressions are missing. The resulting data 
set contains 2,603 observations: 36 certified organic farms and 2,567 uncertified farms.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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4.3. Variables 
Table 1 lists, defines, and presents summary statistics for the variables used in our 
matching analysis, including both outcome variables and grower and farm characteristics. In 
addition to the seven dichotomous outcome variables listed above, we include counts of negative 
and positive practices on each farm—the sum of the three dichotomous outcome variables for 
negative practices, and the sum of the four dichotomous outcome variables for positive practices. 
Mean use rates for the negative practice outcome variables range from a low of 16 percent for 
nematicide use to a high of 73 percent for herbicide use. On average, farms use 1.48 of the three 
negative practices for which we have data. The mean use rates for the positive practice outcome 
variables range from a low of 10 percent for organic fertilizer to 95 percent for use of some 
shade cover. On average, farms use 1.59 of the four positive practices for which we have data.    
To match certified and uncertified farms, we used propensity scores generated by 
regressing an organic certification dummy onto a rich set of grower, farm, and geophysical 
characteristics from our coffee census and GIS data. The grower characteristics are AGE, the age 
of the farmer in years, and four dichotomous dummy variables that indicate the farmer’s highest 
level of education: ED_NONE for no formal education, ED_PRIMARY for primary education, 
ED_SECONDARY for secondary education, and ED_SUPERIOR for more than secondary 
education.  
The farm characteristics are AREA_COFFEE, the number of hectares planted in coffee; 
AREA_COFFEE_SQ, the square of the number of hectares planted; OTHER_LOT, a 
dichotomous dummy variable that indicates whether the farmer has noncontiguous patches of 
coffee in the same “work area”; and four dichotomous dummy variables that indicate the variety 
of coffee planted on the farm: VARIETY_CATA for caturra, VARIETY_CATI for catuai, 
VARIETY_CR95 for Costa Rica-95, and VARIETY_CATE for catimore.  
  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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Table 1. Variables, Definitions, and Means 









OUTCOME VARS.       
  Negative practices       
NEMATICIDE applies  nematicide  (0/1)  0.16 0.00 0.17 
CHEM_FERT  applies chemical fertilizer  (0/1)  0.58 0.11 0.59 
HERBICIDE applies  herbicide  (0/1)  0.73 0.11 0.74 
COUNT_NEG count  above  negative  practices  1.48 0.22 1.50 
  Positive practices       
SOIL_CON  uses soil conserv. practices  (0/1)  0.46 0.58 0.46 
SHADE  uses shade (0/1)  0.95 1.00 0.95 
WINDBREAK  uses windbreaks (0/1)  0.14  0.14  0.14 
ORG_FERT  applies organic fertilizer  (0/1) 0.10 0.67 0.10 
COUNT_POS count  above  positive  practices 1.59 2.36 1.58 
GROWER/FARM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
     
   Grower       
AGE  age  (years)  50.61 46.11 50.67 
ED_NONE  no education (0/1)  0.09 0.06 0.09 
ED_PRIMARY primary  education  (0/1)  0.71 0.64 0.71 
ED_SECONDARY  secondary  education  (0/1)  0.08 0.25 0.08 
ED_SUPERIOR >  secondary  education  (0/1)  0.11 0.06 0.11 
  Farm       
APOT  organic cert or transition (0/1)  0.01  1.00  0.00 
AREA_COFFEE  area coffee on farm  (ha.)  1.29 1.64 1.28 
AREA_COFFEE_SQ  area coffee on farm (ha.) squared  5.66  3.97  5.68 
OTHER_LOT  2 separate plots of coffee  (0/1)  0.37 0.08 0.37 
VARIETY_CATA  coffee variety=caturra (0/1)  0.89  0.97  0.89 
VARIETY_CATI  coffee variety=catuai (0/1)  0.06  0.03  0.06 
VARIETY_CR95  coffee variety=costa rica-95 (0/1)   0.02  0.00  0.02 
VARIETY_CATE  coffee variety=catimore (0/1)   0.02  0.00  0.02 
  Geophysical       
PRECIPITATION  rainfall  (mm)  2994.83 2997.25 2994.80 
PRECIPITATION_SQ  rainfall (mm) squared  9139495  9102179  9140018 
ELEVATION  elevation (m. above sea  level)  894.66 811.03 895.83 
TEMPERATURE  avg. annual temperature (C
o)  22.89 23.09 22.89 
A_LEVEL  % farm level  0.05  0.03  0.05 
A_NORTH  % farm facing north  0.07  0.06  0.07 
A_NORTHEAST  % farm facing northeast  0.15  0.14  0.15 
A_EAST  % farm facing east   0.15  0.14  0.15 
A_SOUTHEAST  % farm facing southeast  0.14 0.10 0.14 
A_SOUTH  % farm facing south  0.12  0.17  0.12 
A_SOUTHWEST  % farm facing southwest  0.11 0.12 0.11 
A_WEST  % farm facing west  0.08 0.12 0.08 
A_NORTHWEST  % farm facing northwest  0.10 0.06 0.10 
SLOPE  average slope (%)
†  27.12 27.36 27.12 
SLOPE_MAX maximum  slope  53.21 54.15 53.20 
SLOPE_SD standard  deviation slope  10.10  9.79  10.10 
LZP_BMHP  % farm v. humid premontane 0.71 0.81    0.71 
LZP_BPP  % farm rain forest premontane   0.17  0.03  0.18 
LZP_BHTTP  % farm v. humid trans prem.   0.02  0.00  0.02 
LZP_BHP  % farm humid premontane    0.03 0.00 0.03 
DISTANCE_SJOSE  ln road distance San José 
(minutes) 
4.79 4.80 4.79 
DISTANCE_CANCAP  ln road distance nearest of 15 
Canton capitals (minutes) 
3.27 3.11 3.27 
†% Slope = 100*tan(п angle/180). 100% slope = 45 degrees. 
‡The 15 canton capitals are Aserri, Cartago, 
Desamparados, Juan Viñas, Pacayas, Paraiso, Parrita, Quepos, San Ignacio, San Marcos, San Pablo, Santa Maria, 
Siquirres, Tejar, and Turrialba. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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The farm-level geophysical variables are PRECIPITATION, the average annual rainfall 
in millimeters; PRECIPITATION_SQ, the square of average annual rainfall;  ELEVATION, the 
average elevation in meters above sea level; TEMPERATURE, the average annual temperature 
in degrees Celsius; SLOPE, the average slope in percent; SLOPE_MAX, the maximum slope in 
percent; SLOPE_SD, the standard deviation of slope; DISTANCE_SJOSE, the natural log of 
travel time in minutes from the farm centroid to San José; and DISTANCE_CANCAP, the 
natural log of the travel time from the farm centroid to the nearest of 15 canton (county) capitals 
in the Turrialba and Coto Brus regions.2 The geophysical variables also include several self-
explanatory aspect variables that indicate the percentage of the farm oriented in different 
directions: A_LEVEL, A_NORTH, A_NORTHEAST, A_EAST, A_SOUTHEAST, A_SOUTH, 
A_SOUTHWEST, A_WEST, and A_NORTHWEST. Finally, we include four variables that 
indicate the percentage of the farm that falls within the most common Holdridge life zones in our 
study area: LZP_BMHP, very humid premontane forest; LZP_BPP, premontane rain forest; 
LZP_BHTTP, very humid transpremontane forest; and LZP_BHP, humid premontane forest.3  
5. Results 
5.1. Propensity Scores and Balance Tests 
Table 2 presents the results from the probit regression (of organic certification on grower 
and farm characteristics) used to generate propensity scores. The results indicate that compared 
with average growers in our sample, certified growers tend to be younger, and that compared 
with average farms in our sample, certified farms tend to be larger (although not extremely 
large), have contiguous growing areas, grow the caturra variety of coffee, and be located at low 
altitudes and in certain life zones. Also, certified farms tend not have a large percentage of their 
farms sloped in certain directions.   
                                                 
2 % Slope = 100*tan(п angle/180). 100% slope = 45 degrees. The 15 canton capitals in our study area are Aserri,  Cartago, 
Desamparados, Juan Viñas, Pacayas,  Paraiso, Parrita, Quepos, San Ignacio, San Marcos, San Pablo, Santa Maria, 
Siquirres, Tejar, and Turrialba.  
3 The Holdridge life zone system is a widely used method of classifying land on the basis of climate and vegetation 
(Holdridge 1979). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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Table 2. Probit regression results 
(dependent variable = organic certification) 
Variable Coefficient  S.E. 
   Grower    
AGE -0.150**  0.066 
ED_PRIMARY 0.049  0.324 
ED_SECONDARY 0.494  0.367 
ED_SUPERIOR -0.148  0.454 
  Farm    
AREA_COFFEE 0.541***  0.206 
AREA_COFFEE_SQ -0.083* 0.044 
OTHER_LOT -0.644***  0.227 
VARIETY_CATA 0.641*  0.368 
  Geophysical    
PRECIPITATION 1.115  3.162 
PRECIPITATION_SQ -0.252  0.548 
ELEVATION -1.486***  0.568 
TEMPERATURE 0.294  0.832 
A_LEVEL -1.436  1.088 
A_NORTH1 -1.426  0.928 
A_NORTHEAST -0.998  0.649 
A_EAST -1.001  0.656 
A_SOUTHEAST -1.454**  0.723 
A_SOUTH -0.377  0.644 
A_SOUTHWEST -1.140*  0.665 
A_WEST -0.656  0.649 
A_NORTHWEST -2.032**  0.933 
SLOPE -0.044  0.104 
SLOPE_MAX 0.006  0.008 
SLOPE_SD -0.346  0.316 
LZP_BMHP -0.053  0.252 
LZP_BPP -0.742*  0.417 
DISTANCE_SJOSE -0.006  0.395 
DISTANCE_CANCAP 0.015  0.144 
CONSTANT -1.698  4.283 
    
Observations 2603   
Pseudo R2  0.194   
LL -153.097   
***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
Having generated propensity scores and used them to match certified and uncertified 
farms, we performed balance tests for the five matching estimators. All except the kernel 
estimator achieved balance (a statistically insignificant difference in covariate means for certified 
and matched uncertified plants) for all 29 covariates. The kernel estimator achieves balance for 
all 29 covariates except OTHER_LOT. Table 3 reports median standardized bias—Rosenbaum 
and Rubin’s (1983) balance statistic—across all covariates for each matching estimator.4 The 
highest median standardized bias is 11.659 for the nearest neighbor 1-1 estimator, and the lowest 
                                                 
4 Standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the certified and uncertified subsamples as a percentage 
of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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is 2.694 for the nearest neighbor 1-16 estimator. Although a clear threshold for acceptable 
median standardized bias does not exist, according to Caliendo and Kopeining (2008), a statistic 
below 3 to 5 percent is generally viewed as sufficient. These encouraging balance statistics are 
likely due to the fact that even though our probit selection model has 29 explanatory variables, 
our sample includes 75 uncertified farms for each certified farm. As a result, we are able to find 
close matches for each certified farm. 
 
Table 3. Matching quality: Median standardized 




(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  11.659 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  4.679 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  4.284 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  2.694 
(v) Kernel  7.530 
aFor a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the difference of means in 
the certified and matched uncertified subsamples as a percentage of the square 
root of the average sample variance in both groups. We report the median SB 
for all covariates. 
bMedian SB before matching is 16.422. 
 
5.2. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
Table 4 presents results from the five matching estimators for the negative practices—
nematicides, chemical fertilizers, herbicides—and for a count of negative practices.5 The results 
strongly indicate that certification significantly reduces use of negative practices. For each 
negative practice, ATT is negative and significant for all five matching estimators. In each case, 
the magnitude of the effect is substantial. For nematicides, it ranges from 14 to 18 percentage 
points; that is, the rate of nematicide use is 14 to 18 percentage points lower among certified 
growers than among matched uncertified growers who represent the counterfactual. For chemical 
fertilizers, ATT ranges from 43 to 45 percentage points, and for herbicides, it ranges from 61 to 
71 percentage points. Finally, for the count of negative practices, ATT ranges from 1.2 to 1.3, 
implying that on average, certified growers use 1.2 to 1.3 fewer negative practices than matched 
uncertified growers.   
                                                 
5 Note that the mean of the outcome variables for certified farmers is positive, albeit small, implying that a handful 
of the 32 certified growers in our sample used chemical inputs in 2003. APOT organic standards allow the 
occasional use of chemical inputs when deemed necessary and preauthorized by a local Eco-Logica inspector (see 
Appendix A, items 1g and 5c). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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Table 4. Negative practices: Average treatment effect on treated (ATT) 
estimates, by outcome variable and matching method;  






a P-value  Γ*
b 
Nematicide       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0  -0.143  0.074  0.053  3.0 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0  -0.150  0.052  0.004  10.6 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0  -0.179  0.041  0.000  17.6 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0  -0.157  0.030  0.000  17.2 
(v) Kernel  0  -0.152  0.012  0.000  17.2 
Chemical fertilizer       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.114  -0.429  0.118  0.000  4.6 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.114  -0.464  0.086  0.000  6.2 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.114  -0.454  0.075  0.000  5.4 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.114  -0.448  0.064  0.000  8.0 
(v)  Kernel  0.114 -0.449 0.058 0.000  10.0 
Herbicides       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.114  -0.714  0.105  0.000  7.8 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.114  -0.643  0.080  0.000  10.0 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.114  -0.607  0.074  0.000  10.0 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.114  -0.582  0.064  0.000  11.0 
(v)  Kernel  0.114 -0.595 0.058 0.000  10.0 
Count negative practices       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.229  -1.286  0.193  0.000  9.8 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.229  -1.257  0.153  0.000  16.8 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.229  -1.239  0.129  0.000  13.4 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.229  -1.188  0.110  0.000  13.4 
(v)  Kernel  0.229 -1.197 0.095 0.000  12.2 
aComputed using bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. 
bCritical value of odds of differential assignment to organic certification due to unobserved 
factors (i.e., value above which ATT is no longer significant). 
 
Table 5 presents results from the five matching estimators for the positive practices—soil 
conservation, shade, windbreaks, and organic fertilizer—and for a count of positive practices.6 
The results provide strong evidence that organic certification increases the use of only one 
positive practice: organic fertilizer. For this practice, ATT is positive and significant for all five 
matching estimators, and the magnitude of the effect is substantial, ranging from 59 to 63 
percentage points. The results provide much weaker evidence that organic certification increases 
the use of shade cover and soil conservation. For shade cover, ATT is significant for three of the 
five matching estimators (all but nearest neighbor 1-1 and 1-4). However, the magnitude of the 
                                                 
6 Note that the mean of the outcome variables for certified farmers is less than 1, implying that some of the certified 
growers in our sample had not adopted the four environmental management practices we consider. In particular, less 
than one-sixth of certified farmers adopted windbreaks. Eco-Logica inspectors relax certification requirements in 
certain cases—for example, when winds are so inconsequential that windbreaks are not needed. In general, 
inspectors enforce prohibitions against negative practices (use of agrochemicals) more stringently than they require 
the positive ones (soil conservation, etc.) (Soto 2009). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
15 
effect is small, ranging from 4 to 5 percentage points. For soil conservation, ATT is significant 
for two of the five matching estimators (nearest neighbor 1-1 and 1-16). In each case, ATT is 
significant, ranging from 15 to 29 percentage points. For windbreaks, none of the matching 
estimators generate a significant ATT. Finally, for the count of positive practices, ATT is 
positive and significant for all five matching estimators, although the magnitude of the effect is 
not large, ranging from 0.8 to 0.9.  
 
Table 5. Positive practices: Average treatment effect on treated (ATT)  
estimates, by outcome variable and matching method;  






a P-value  Γ*
b 
Soil conservation       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.571  0.286  0.128  0.026  1.6 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.571  0.143  0.102  0.162  -- 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.571  0.132  0.092  0.150  -- 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.571  0.146  0.087  0.094  1.4 
(v)  Kernel  0.571 0.134 0.087 0.125  -- 
Shade       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  1.000  0.029  0.042  0.501  -- 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  1.000  0.043   0.032  0.181  -- 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  1.000  0.043  0.022  0.056  6.2 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  1.000  0.045  0.017  0.008  11.6 
(v)  Kernel  1.000 0.049 0.007 0.000  17.2 
Windbreak       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.143  0.000  0.087  1.000  -- 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.143  0.014  0.075  0.849  -- 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.143  0.043  0.064  0.501  -- 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.143  0.032  0.064  0.616  -- 
(v)  Kernel  0.143 -0.010 0.065 0.877  -- 
Organic fertilizer       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  0.657  0.629  0.084  0.000  13.8 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  0.657  0.614  0.086  0.000  9.0 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  0.657  0.604  0.085  0.000  4.4 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  0.657  0.589  0.084  0.000  3.4 
(v)  Kernel  0.657 0.587 0.082 0.000  3.6 
Count positive practices       
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1  2.343  0.9143  0.2110  0.000  3.8 
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4  2.343  0.7929  0.1731  0.000  3.8 
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8  2.343  0.8107  0.1577  0.000  3.6 
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16  2.343  0.8143  0.1613  0.000  3.2 
(v) Kernel  2.343  0.7748  0.1446  0.000  2.6 
aComputed using bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions.  
bCritical value of odds of differential assignment to organic certification due to unobserved factors 
(i.e., value above which ATT is no longer significant).  
 
Hence, our results suggest that organic certification has a stronger causal effect on 
negative practices than positive ones. This finding comports with anecdotal evidence that Eco-
Logica inspectors do not enforce all of the organic certification standards listed in Appendix A Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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equally: enforcement is more stringent for standards prohibiting negative practices than for those 
requiring positive ones (Soto 2009).  
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Might endogeneity drive our results? As noted above, the effectiveness of our matching 
estimators in controlling for selection bias depends on the untestable identifying assumption that 
we are able to observe confounding variables that simultaneously affect growers’ decisions to 
obtain organic certification and to use (or not use) the production practices that serve as our 
outcome variables. That is, we essentially assume endogeneity is not a problem. We calculate 
Rosenbaum bounds to check the sensitivity of our results to the failure of this assumption 
(Rosenbaum 2002; Aakvik 2001).7 Rosenbaum bounds indicate how strongly unobserved 
confounding factors would need to influence growers’ decisions to obtain organic certification in 
order to undermine the matching result. To be more specific, the Rosenbaum procedure 
generates a probability value for Wilcoxon sign-rank statistic for a series of values of Γ, an index 
of the strength of the influence that unobserved confounding factors have on the selection 
process. Γ = 1 implies that such factors have no influence, such that pairs of growers matched on 
observables do not differ in their odds of obtaining organic certification; Γ = 2 implies that 
matched pairs could differ in their odds of certification by as much as a factor of two because of 
unobserved confounding factors; and so forth. The probability value on the Wilcoxon sign-rank 
statistic is a test of the null hypothesis of a zero ATT given unobserved confounding variables 
that have an effect given by Γ. So, for example, a probability value of 0.01 and a Γ of 1.2 
indicate that ATT would still be significant at the 1 percent level even if matched pairs differed 
in their odds of certification by a factor of 1.2 because of unobserved confounding factors.  
We calculate  Γ*, the critical value of Γ at which ATT is no longer significant at the 10 
percent level in each case—that is, for each combination of production practice and matching 
estimator—where ATT is significant (Tables 4 and 5, last column). Except in the case of soil 
conservation, Γ* is at least 3.0, and in most cases it is considerably larger. For the nematicide 
estimators, Γ* is at least 10.6 for four of the five matching estimators; for the chemical fertilizer 
models, it is at least 4.6; for the herbicide models, it is at least 7.8; and for the count of negative 
practices models, it is at least 9.8. Except in the case of soil conservation, the results for positive 
practice ATTs are similar. For shade, Γ* is at least 6.2; for organic fertilizer, it is at least 3.4; and 
                                                 
7 An example of an unobserved confounder might be environmental consciousness or managerial skill. Each could 
cause growers to select into organic certification and—independent of certification—to use fewer negative practices 
and more positive ones.   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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for a count of positive practices, it is at least 3.2. Hence, our sensitivity tests suggest that 
unobserved confounders would need to be quite strong to undermine our statistically significant 
results. In other words, endogeneity is unlikely to drive our results.  
6. Conclusion 
We have used detailed cross-sectional data on more than 2,600 coffee farms in central 
Costa Rica to identify the environmental impacts of organic coffee certification. We have used 
propensity score matching techniques to control for self-selection bias. Our findings suggest that 
certification significantly reduces use of all three chemical inputs for which we have data—
pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and herbicides—and increases adoption of at least one of the four 
environmentally friendly management practices for which we have data—organic fertilizer. 
Our findings contrast with those from the only three methodologically rigorous studies of 
commodity certification environmental impacts, all of which find that eco-certification has no 
causal effects. They also contrast with findings from several less rigorous studies of coffee 
certification. What might explain these differences? First, we have examined a certification 
scheme that has relatively well defined, stringent standards enforced at the individual farm level 
by independent third-party monitors. The forest and tourism certification schemes summarized in 
Section 3 do not have these attributes. The Sustainable Slopes Program examined by Rivera and 
de Leon (2004) and Rivera et al. (2006) has relatively lax standards enforced by a trade 
association, and at least some of the coffee certification programs analyzed by Quispe Guanca 
(2007) (e.g., Rainforest Alliance) are at the cooperative level rather than the farm level.   
Second, in Costa Rica’s coffee sector, opportunities for certification impacts to be 
undermined by self-selection—that is, opportunities for growers already meeting organic 
standards to obtain certification—may be relatively limited. As noted in Section 3, coffee 
growing in Costa Rica is heavily technified. Most farmers use chemical inputs, and few use 
organic fertilizers (Table 1). Therefore, relatively few farms are able to obtain certification 
without significantly changing their management practices. This is not the case in the regions of 
Nicaragua and Mexico studied by Philpott et al. (2007) and Martínez-Sánchez (2008). Here, 
most growers use rustic practices and few chemical inputs (Rice and Ward 1996).     
Finally, our study has looked at the impact of certification on various management 
practices, not on ecological indicators like bird diversity, the focus of studies by Philpott et al. 
(2007) and Martínez-Sánchez (2008). Presumably, certification can alter management practices 
more easily than it can generate changes in ecological indicators.   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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What are the policy implications of our findings? They suggest that commodity 
certification schemes that require adherence to well-defined stringent standards, are enforced at 
the individual farm level by independent third-party monitors, and are implemented in areas 
where producers do not already adhere to these standards can have significant environmental 
benefits. That said, certification schemes meeting these criteria may have an important 
disadvantage: they are likely to entail significant costs for producers. Absent high price 
premiums or other benefits from certification, these costs will discourage certification. Indeed, 
the relatively small number of certified organic producers in our sample (1 percent) likely 
reflects this phenomenon.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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Appendix A. Organic Producers’ Association of Turrialba Standards for Organic 
Production (APOT 2001)   
 
1. Soil conservation 
a.   Must use soil conservation practices: drains , canals, terraces, contour planting, 
contamination barriers, and overflow ditches.  
b.   Must not use herbicides, pesticides, or synthetic goods that damage the soil. 
c.   Must use diverse shade (legumes, fruits, leñosas, Musacaeas, etc.) that will be 
shade useful to the family, coffee and nature. 
d.   Must not permit the soil to be exposed to the sun, using soil cover, such as shade, 
coffee, grass or dead cover. It is recommended to use dead cover in the case of 
specialty vegetables. 
e.   Must use wind breaks when necessary, with preference for species that are useful 
for the family and the farm. 
f.   Must incorporate organic material in the soil, such as bocashi, compost, 
lombricompost, etc. 
g.   Must give preference to always using the resource of the farm, but when 
necessary it is permissible to use external inputs of natural original, such as: 
products mineral like lime, la rotoca fosforical, cal dolomita, K-Mg, zinc sulfate, 
and magnesium sulfate, in cases of documented deficiency 
h.   If cultivation requires it and conditions permit, it’s permitted to use a plow. 
i.   It is permitted to plant without contours only in already-established plantings, but 
in new plantations, contour planting is required. 
2. Protection and management of water 
a.   Must take care to ensure there is good management of water in the farm: 
reforestation around the rivers, acequias o quegbradas, to avoid erosion and 
contamination of the waters with agrochemicals and trash. 
b.   Must manage water rationally when irrigation is used. 
3. Care of biodiversity 
a.   Must take care the farm has a variety of trees, birds, plants, and insects to protect 
nature and aid in the control of natural pests. 
b.   Must have diversity in the foods in the farms for animals and humans. 
c.   Must have biodiversity that permits having different income/inputs for the 
producer and his family in different seasons of the year. 
d.   Must have diversity of cultivation for example rotation of crops in the case of 
cultivos temporales, cultivos intercalados, etc. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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e.   Using the coffee variety “catimor” is not permitted for new planting and 
replanting coffee. 
4. Care of farm animals 
a.   Must provide the animals space that is sufficient, ventilated, and clean. They 
cannot be in stables all the time. 
b.   Must provide animals with clean organic food. 
c.   Must have diversity of food for farm animals. 
d.   Must have a good management of the animal wastes of the farm: must avoid 
contamination. 
e.   Must use natural control of disease, medicinal plants, and natural control of 
parasites. 
5. Management of pests and sicknesses 
a.   Must favor diversity of cultivation that aids in the natural control of pests and 
sicknesses. 
b.   Must manage the soil with a diversity of organic material. 
c.   The cases where deemed necessary, and with previous authorization of the local 
inspector, it is permitted to use sulfato de cobre o caldo bordeles but it’s not 
permitted to apply more than 6.2 kg/ha/year. 
d.   It is not permitted to use gasoline for burning of zomopas. 
6. Contamination of the farm 
a.   It’s not permitted to throw wastes of containers of agrochemicals in the farm or in 
sources of water. 
b.   It is not permitted to apply synthetic agrochemicals 36 months before the harvest. 
c.   Must maintain the distance and the live barrier necessary to avoid contamination 
that comes from neighboring lots that use agrochemicals. 
7. Post harvest management practices 
a.   Must only take fresh, mature coffee to the mill. 
b.   Must not use sacks contaminated with synthetic agrochemicals.  
c.   Cannot mix organic product with transitional product. 
d.   In cases where growers are producing organic coffee and coffee in transition, they 
must carefully label the organic coffee to avoid mixing it with other types of 
coffee. 
e.   The transport of organic products must be clean and free of contamination.  
8. General care of the farm 
a.   Must plan the farm well and have roads that do not promote erosion. 
b.   The organic producer must not grow conventional and organic in the same 
cultivated field in  (parallel production). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Naranjo 
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c.   The organic producer that already has conventional parcels on which crops other 
than coffee are grown must have a plan for converting the entire farm to organic 
within the next five years. 
d.   Must use live barriers to clearly separate organic lots and conventional lots. 
9. Norms for the management of the quality of life of producers 
a.   The organic producer must understand the principles of organic agriculture. 
b.   The organic producer must undertake training periodically. 
 